



# Approximating Optimal Morphing Attacks using Template Inversion





Laurent Colbois

## Scenario – An attack on an automated face recognition system



# Generation : inversion of the optimal morph embedding



- 2 inverted FR systems
- 2 inversion methods




# Evaluation of the morphing method

## Vulnerability analysis

FRS	Attack	MinMax-MPMR (%)	ProdAvg-MPMR (%)
AF	□ MIPGAN	73.22	54.77
	□ Inv-AF	<b>89.88</b>	<b>74.76</b>
	□ GAN-Inv-AF	42.76	22.81
	■ SG-W	4.32	1.44
	■ SG-W+	60.10	39.97
	■ Inv-EF	<b>79.65</b>	<b>61.46</b>
	■ GAN-Inv-EF	16.46	5.85
EF	□ Inv-EF	<b>87.78</b>	<b>74.58</b>
	□ GAN-Inv-EF	28.88	14.52
	■ SG-W	10.19	3.56
	■ SG-W+	67.63	48.90
	■ MIPGAN	<b>75.80</b>	<b>60.10</b>
	■ Inv-AF	75.09	58.25
	■ GAN-Inv-AF	28.20	14.73

## Detectability



- Inv is more effective against FR systems. Limitations in realism.
- GAN-Inv is not there yet but more realistic, and challenging to the detectors
- Future work
  - Comparison to non-deep methods
  - Print-scan
  - Morph fine-tuning